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tence occupations that do not require modern human capital.
People who had been patient in 1999–2000 had greater wage
earnings and more modern physical assets in 2004. In a cul-
tural context where, according to the author, there is self-
selection even on pertinence to ethnic groups, the lack of
attention to the potential endogeneity of the individual
choices analyzed is surprising.
Norbert Ross
Department of Anthropology, Vanderbilt University, 124 Garland
Hall, Nashville, Tennessee 37235, U.S.A. (norbert.o.ross@vanderbilt
.edu). 25 X 11
Tucker addresses what he calls the “wealth” versus “ethnicity”
debate. His data show that (1) both coping and conformity
might play a role and (2) previous positions were wrongfully
posed as opposites. Tucker is right and wrong. Here, I would
like to discuss three issues. First, while Tucker discusses the
role of experiments, he leaves the issue of “mental accounting”
aside. A fair amount of literature shows that money is not
always treated the same way. Money received as a gift is spent
differently than “regular money.” A person finding $100 on
the street before entering a casino is more likely to spend that
money than the $100 salary increase she just received. This
very likely also applies to money to be gained in risk exper-
iments—the risk-taking pattern with experimental money
might differ from risk taking in every day life. This problem
is increased if the researcher relies on one single experiment
and little to no ethnographic data. Second, it is not always
clear what experiments measure. The ultimatum game can be
described as a way of testing individual risk taking, or it can
be seen as testing social interactions (one person has to make
an offer to the other player in terms of a division of a set
amount, rendering any straightforward interpretation of the
experiment at least problematic). Third, decisions are always
made within a context. Just as risk taking in the ultimatum
game is not independent of social interactions (do I want to
look like an egoistic person, or do I forsake potential eco-
nomic gains in order to look like a nice guy?), neither is the
“wealth hypothesis.” The wealth hypothesis clearly depends
on people’s aspirations and goals. Of course, in extreme pov-
erty people might not be able to take any risk or delay small
benefits for a greater benefit in the future, but that does not
mean that beyond the point of extreme poverty an increase
in income automatically means an increase in risk taking (or
the opposite). These things depend on models, aspirations,
and values (themselves embedded in relations of power, class,
and inequality) that seem to be ignored by most of the relevant
literature. For example, in real life a delayed benefit might be
bigger than an immediate return yet very likely introduces a
(perhaps small) chance of not receiving anything at all (what
if the bank goes out of business, etc.). While experimentally
we can hold these variables constant, the question is whether
this approximates any real-life situation. Kahneman and Tver-
sky opened up a debate of framing in decision making that
should be followed by anthropologists beyond the point of
framing a decision in terms of loss and gain to include a
better understanding of what a specific decision is about. This
leads me back to Tucker’s point, that both wealth and con-
formity/ethnicity play a role. For that to be the case, he needs
to show that his model performs better in explaining the data
collected by Kuznar, Henrich, and colleagues than their own
respective models. If not, his data could be peculiar to a
specific field setting, about which he does not tell us much.
Part of the problem seems to be that in many of these studies
the net is cast too wide and hence does not go deep. For
example, Tucker correctly points out that the conformity hy-
pothesis relies on “ethnicity” being a variable that significantly
explains variation in responses. However, this could mean
many things. It could mean that people conform (as assumed
by the authors), or it could mean that some other variable
correlates with ethnicity, driving an effect that does not link
ethnicity and response variation in a causal way. Why not ask
what people are doing? Why they respond the way they do?
What these questions actually mean to them? Why not explore
risk taking in real-life situations (Frank Cancian’s 1972 book
comes to mind) and use experimental research to pinpoint
more specific questions within a more confined setting?
Tucker realizes the problems with experiments in that real-
life decisions are often embedded in habits and wider beliefs
about the world. In fact, he parallels the risk experiments to
new upcoming market opportunities, yet I wonder why such
market opportunities did not become the target of his study?
Who takes what kind of market opportunities, and why (or
why not)? This is what Cancian did, trying to understand
which sector of a community would take on new agricultural
strategies. Such an approach seems promising if paired with
experiments as proposed by Tucker and more true to reality,
which is after all what we want to explain. To conclude, Tucker
is right in that his data show that both conformity and wealth
play a role in risk taking in his specific field setting. He is
wrong in that his work cannot refute research in other parts
of the world and in that his work—as did the one by previous
researchers—seems to ignore many important aspects and
variables that one would like to see taken into account.
Eric Schniter and Nathaniel T. Wilcox
Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University
Drive, Orange, California 92866, U.S.A. (schniter@chapman.edu).
14 X 11
Social Norms, Discrete Choices, and False
Dichotomies
We commend Tucker for a well-executed study that success-
fully uncovers rich relationships between contexts and be-
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havior. We agree that equating ethnic and spatial effects with
social learning and wealth effects with individual learning is
to force a false dichotomy. These two hypotheses need not
be mutually exclusive; individual and social learning may both
be active at the individual level regardless of whether choices
conform to norms. We would like to add further caution to
these persistent and fallacious either/or debates by illustrating
additional reasons why the presence and absence of social
effects is tenuous evidence (at best) for a causal pathway
between social learning and individuals’ discrete choice be-
havior.
Suppose we failed to find effects of some spatial groupings
on some choice variable. This does not imply an absence of
social learning. There are at least two good reasons why social
learning will not always produce evidence of social norms in
spatial groupings: (1) social learning also occurs according to
irregularly distributed network patterns (e.g., kin networks)
that crosscut space and (2) even if and when social learning
occurs in spatial groupings, choices influenced by learning
can be very sensitive to the timing and sequence of sampled
information.
Social learning, whether observed in birds, fish, or mam-
mals (see Gibson and Hoglund [1992] and Pruett-Jones
[1992] for reviews), is not an indiscriminate process. Instead,
these studies demonstrate that learning strategies are sensitive
to cues directing organisms when to learn from others and
who to learn from (Laland 2004). We expect that human
foragers, who interact most frequently with affinal and con-
sanguineal kin (e.g., see Hill et al. 2011), will differentially
acquire information about things like monetary choices from
familiar kin. Using logistic regressions, we analyzed unpub-
lished survey data from Schniter’s dissertation of Tsimane
nominations of experts (made by judges competent in the
skill) and found that kinship is a significant predictor of in-
dividuals’ nominations even after detailed accounting for spa-
tial relationships. With kinship and villages of nominees and
judges accounted for, additional spatial variables (domicile
clusters or exact domiciles) contribute little to explained var-
iance (R2 increases by 0.0024). By contrast, with all spatial
variables in the model, adding kinship explains variance by
six times more. Tucker observes that in his sample individuals
“intermarry freely” and “genealogies crosscut the three iden-
tities.” We suspect that by controlling for kinship Tucker
might explain even more relational variance and further clar-
ify how strategic and social variables relate to individual de-
cisions.
Tucker suggests that some subjects did not understand all
tasks. Where participants are uncertain about the task and
best decisions but where they can sequentially sample others’
choices, “information cascades” (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch 1992, 1998) can produce “norms” that trump the
influence of prior private information. Conformism under
cascades is sensitive to the timing of modal choice sequences
(earlier revelation causes stronger cascades). Norms produced
this way are thus idiosyncratic and fragile (differentially af-
fected by order effects). If Tucker’s data are a product of
cascades, it could manifest as emergent norms in some places
and times but not in others.
Three of Tucker’s capital measures (human, social, and
material wealth) are reported to covary with income, and
other correlations among Tucker’s explanatory variables are
plausible but not reported. When subsets of explanatory var-
iables in models are sufficiently correlated, variables in the
subset can be individually insignificant while the subset var-
iables are jointly significant. Overall model fit does not suffer,
but understanding can be compromised. For example, log
income has one of the largest effect sizes in Tucker’s table 4,
yet it is insignificant: perhaps it and the other strategic var-
iables would be jointly significant. We would have liked to
see a correlation table for Tucker’s strategic variables and F-
tests of joint significance for subsets of correlated variables
to aid interpretation of the statistical results.
We close with two cautions. First, experiments reveal strong
randomness of discrete risky choice (Wilcox 2008); Camerer
(1989) described such choices as “distressingly close to . . .
random” (81). Tucker’s scrupulous attention to the reliability
of independent measures is excellent. But the low reliability
of dependent measures—single-choice indicators—means
that 350 observations will not sort out the effects of three
dozen explanatory variables with great replicability. Second,
monetary risk preferences may not share significant variance
with risk preferences over other outcomes (e.g., health, status,
or reproductive outcomes). The “domain generality” of risk
preference is contentious throughout the social and cognitive
sciences, with results both pessimistic (e.g., Berg, Dickhaut,
and McCabe 2005; Hanoch, Johnson, and Wilke 2006; Her-
shey and Schoemaker 1985) and optimistic (e.g., Barsky et
al. 1997; Dave and Saffer 2007; Schmidt 2008). While male
violence and competitive risk taking predicted by Wilson and
Daly (1985) may help explain risky choices (like sleeping out
in a forest, going to sea, and going on cattle raids), they may
covary little with monetary risk choices.
Eric Alden Smith
Department of Anthropology, University of Washington, Box
353100, Seattle, Washington 98195-3100, U.S.A. (easmith@uw
.edu). 13 X 11
I commend Tucker for employing multiple currencies to mea-
sure risk and time preference and defining multiple scales of
social identity to which individuals might conform in norms
and practices. In addition, testing multiple alternative hy-
potheses with the same data is all too rare in anthropology,
as he notes, and the tests here are rigorous (if a bit numbing
in their thoroughness). I would have preferred a set of tests
more tightly tied to deductively generated expectations, but
this is certainly a sophisticated analysis by the standards of
sociocultural anthropology. Tucker links his analysis to
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